



A LIBERAL EXPLORATION OF THE LEGAL PROHIBITION ON 
SELECTION FOR DISABILITY IN ENGLAND AND WALES. 
 
 
ABSTRACT - This paper concerns the insertion into English and Welsh law of a prohibition 
on selection for disability in one’s offspring for social reasons via the use of assisted 
reproductive technologies. It explores the changes in law that have occurred since the 2008 
HFEA Act and subjects to philosophical scrutiny, from a liberal perspective of the limits of 
law, the reasons that have been given within legal and policy documents for its insertion. 
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In January 2004 the UK government announced a review of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 19901 – the primary piece of legislation regulating the practices of artificial 
reproduction and embryo research in England and Wales – with the primary aim of updating 
the law in order “to keep pace with new avenues of scientific research and… reflect wider 
change in our society”.2 Four years later, and after a great deal of debate and discussion the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 – which provided 127 pages of amendments 
for a document which originally contained only 39 pages – received royal assent. Such 
amendments have, to a large degree, constituted a liberalising force. The Act, for example, now 
recognises both members of same sex couples as the legal parents of children conceived via 
donated gametes, and has replaced the ‘need for a father’ provision present in the 1990 Act 
with a more inclusive gender-neutral provision regarding a child’s need for ‘supportive 
parenting.’  
 
Yet, while many changes have been met with approval by groups that the 1990 Act might 
have been seen to ignore or devalue, and some have even criticised those responsible for the 
legislative changes for having taken an ‘extreme libertarian approach’,3 not all of such changes 
should be viewed as so liberalising. Elliston notes that “in one area the HFEA 2008 has taken 
a uniquely restrictive step…[seeking] for the first time in the UK to make it impermissible at 
least in certain circumstances, to choose to try to have children that are known to have particular 
genetic constitutions”4 where prospective parents require/seek access to ARTs such as Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) and In Vitro Fertilisation (IVF). Such restrictions apply 
generally to any and all forms of pre-implantation selection of which the purpose is not to avoid 
the birth of a child with a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality; to select embryos 
with tissue types compatible with existing siblings with serious medical conditions that can be 
treated with umbilical cord blood stem cells, bone marrow, or other tissue; or to determine, in 
                                                     
1 Hereafter to be referred to as the Act or where specification is required the 1990 Act, the 2008 Act or 
the amended Act.  
2 HC Deb, 12 May 2008, c1066.  
3 Science and Technology Select Committee, Inquiry into Human Reproductive Technologies and the 
Law (HC 2004-05 491), pp. 4-5. 
4  S. Elliston (2012) 'The Welfare of the Child Principle and the Use of PGD: Selecting for Disability', 
in S Elliston and S Mclean (eds.), Regulating Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, Oxford: Routledge, 
pp. 136-137. 
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cases where uncertainty has arisen, the parentage of embryos before implantation.5 They also 
apply specifically to two particular types of selection: sex selection for social reasons via PGD6 
or gamete selection7, and the comparatively rare practice of deliberately selecting for disability 
in one’s offspring using the same means.8  As a result, those who perform PGD or utilise other 
selective reproductive technologies without a licence/outside the terms of a licence are now 
guilty of a criminal offence punishable by a prison sentence of up to two years and/or a fine. 
 
This paper concerns the second of the specific restrictions noted above: the insertion into 
English and Welsh law of a prohibition on the use of ARTs for the purpose of selecting for 
disability. In order to provide context for readers I begin by providing an account of the desire 
itself and examples of some who have been shown to hold such a desire. A comparison of how 
a request to select for disability in one’s offspring would have been met prior to the 2008 
amendments with how such a request is now met is then made. This is done in order to show 
the reader firstly how the law has changed and secondly to bring together the reasons given in 
legal and policy documents for this change. Such reasons are then subjected to philosophical 
scrutiny from the perspective of a liberal account of the limits of law. Once it is explained why 
these reasons are inadequate, other possible arguments in favour of a prohibition against 
selection for disability are then explored. 
 
 
II. LAW AND POLICY REGARDING SELECTION FOR DISABILITY 
 
In the last 60 years, since the Abortion Act 1967 decriminalised termination for reasons of foetal 
abnormality9, and pre-natal screening techniques were developed such as Amniocentesis in the 
late 1950s; Chorionic Villus Sampling (CVS) in the 1970s; IVF and PGD in the 1980’s; and 
maternal blood screening in the 2000s reproductive choice has increased dramatically for 
prospective parents who are willing and able to access such technologies and techniques. 
 
 These technologies have, for the most part, been used to help potential parents conceive 
and give birth to children free from genetic disease and disability or to make adequate 
preparations for the birth of a child who may have complex medical and/or social needs. In 
recent years however, it has become apparent that some prospective parents harbour a desire to 
select for traits in their offspring which are widely viewed to be deleterious. The most 
publicised example of this is likely that of Duchesneau and McCullough, a profoundly deaf 
couple from the USA who, in the early 2000s, successfully ensured the birth of two congenitally 
deaf children via a fifth-generation deaf sperm donor and artificial insemination.10 
 
Such cases, however, are not isolated, and a number of surveys and anecdotal studies 
published in the last few years show that for deaf persons, especially those identifying as 
culturally deaf (Deaf), a desire for a deaf child is not as uncommon as many would assume. For 
example, one study undertaken at a ‘Deaf Nation’ conference showed that 29% of respondents 
gave a positive answer to the question of whether they would prefer to parent deaf children.11 
Indeed, despite a widespread distrust of pre-implantation and pre-natal genetic diagnosis within 
                                                     
5 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 2008), Sch. 2.3.1ZA. s. (1).  
6  ibid, Sch. 2, S.3.para 1ZC(3). 
7  ibid, Sch. 2. S. 4. Para 1A. 
8  ibid, s.13(9).  
9 Abortion Act, 1967, s. 1(d).  
10 M. Spriggs (2002) 'Lesbian Couple Create a Child Who Is Deaf Like Them', Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 28 (5) p. 275.  
11 A. Middleton, J. Hewison, and R. Mueller (1998) ‘Attitudes of Deaf Adults toward Genetic Testing 
for Hereditary Deafness', American Journal of Human Genetics, 63, p. 1175.  
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the deaf community,12 the idea of employing ARTs to increase the likelihood of the birth of a 
deaf child has also been met with enthusiasm by some deaf persons, with a small number of 
respondents to another survey noting they would consider aborting a foetus if it was discovered 
it could hear.13 That such is the case is also evidenced by a study of the practices of United 
States IVF clinics showed 3% of the 190 clinics involved had received requests for, and 
provided PGD to, prospective parents who wished to select for disability in their offspring.14 
Indeed, when the 2008 amendments to the HFE Act regarding selection for disability were 
proposed a deaf artist and broadcaster appeared on the BBC’s Today programme15 and in 
various newspapers expressing his disappointment at the fact that he and his wife would be 
unable to use PGD to select for deafness should they require IVF in the future.16 
 
 Desires like this are also not confined to the deaf community. A 2006 article in the New 
York Times reported the stories of two women with Achondroplasia who, when undergoing 
genetic testing during their pregnancies to ensure their foetuses were not subject to a fatal 
double dose of the Achondroplasia gene, expressed a desire for a child who was ‘little’ like 
them. Indeed, one noted that were IVF and PGD less invasive procedures she would be willing 
to use such technologies to secure the birth of a child with Achondroplasia.17 
 
It should be noted too that despite a lack of evidence it is possible that persons with other 
disabilities may express similar desires. This seems especially likely for those with conditions 
around which a strong culture, based on a shared experience of the world, has developed and 
for those whose disabilities are relatively easily (and often) compensated for by society or who 
have learned to accept and embrace their disabilities as either a neutral or positive characteristic. 
Indeed, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that certain non-disabled individuals may 
express a desire to select for disability in virtue of their association of that disability with 
characteristics they view to be desirable. Hearing persons may, for example, wish to have deaf 
children if most of their family are deaf and individuals who view that children with Down’s 
Syndrome are invariably bundles of joy ready to furnish those around them with unconditional 
love, may, given this romantic-but-faulty belief, wish to select for it. Given this, the question 
of how a request to select for disability would have been met prior to the 2008 act and how 
such a request will be met now will be addressed. 
 
II.I. Selecting for disability prior to the 2008 amendments: The HFEA and the Welfare 
Principle. 
 
In England and Wales, the activities of fertility clinics in relation to the use and storage of 
embryos and gametes are regulated by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. A 
                                                     
12  ibid., p. 1176.  
13 C. Dennis (2004) 'Genetics: Deaf by Design', Nature, 431(7011), p. 895. 
14 S. Baruch, D. Kaufman, and K. L. Hudson (2008) 'Genetic Testing of Embryos: Practices and 
Perspectives of Us in Vitro Fertilization Clinics', Fertility and sterility, 89 (5), p. 1058. 
15 Today  (10 March 2008) (Radio Programme, BBC), audio download available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/today/listenagain/listenagain_20080310.shtml, [last accessed 10 
November 2013]. 
16 D.  Lawson (2008), 'Of Course a Deaf Couple Want a Deaf Child', Independent, 11 March 2008, sec. 
Voices., available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/dominic-lawson/dominic-
lawson-of-course-a-deaf-couple-want-a-deaf-child-794001.html, [last accessed 10 November 2013]; A. 
O'Hagan, 'Some 'Gifts' One Is Better Off Without', The Telegraph 2008, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/andrewo_hagan/3555996/Some-gifts-one-is-better-
off-without.html, [last accessed 10 November 2013]. 
17 D. M. Sanghavi, (2006) 'Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose Genetic Defects', 
New York Times, 5 December 2006., available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05essa.html?ref=science&_r=0, [last accessed 10 
November 2013]. 
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fertility clinic may only offer fertility treatments licensed by the HFEA and the kinds of fertility 
treatments the HFEA may license are limited to those that fulfil licensing conditions set out in 
the HFE Act. Clinics found to have licensed the use of ARTs for any purposes other than those 
outlined as acceptable in the 2008 Act may lose their license to perform genetic testing. Indeed, 
persons found guilty of such an offence are liable on conviction to be imprisoned “for a term 
not exceeding two years or a fine or both, and… on summary conviction, to imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both”.18 
Despite this, until the 2008 amendments the HFEA actually had a great deal of discretionary 
power when deciding which fertility treatments to license as the licensing conditions for fertility 
treatment, set out in sections 12-15 of the 1990 Act were rather vague, providing no statutory 
prohibitions. Indeed, they contained only one provision of relevance to HFEA decisions 
regarding the circumstances and purposes for which it would provide fertility treatment to 
couples requesting it.  
 
This provision is known as ‘The Welfare of The Child Provision’ and is derived from and 
viewed to constitute an extension of a principle that has, over the last century, become an 
increasingly dominant feature in both family and criminal law in England and Wales: the 
Welfare Principle (WP).19 In its most simple form WP consists in a requirement that the welfare 
of children be taken into account by the courts in scenarios where their interests will be affected 
by its decision. It can be found in a number of statutes with slight variations in terms of strength 
between them,20 but is usually understood in the way it is set out it the Children Act (1989), 
which provides: “when a court determines any question with respect to – (a) the upbringing of 
a child; or (b) the administration of a child’s property or the application of any income arising 
from it, the child’s welfare shall be the courts paramount consideration”.21  
 
Within the HFE Acts the welfare of the child provision is slightly less strict, requiring that 
before licensing any kind of fertility treatment account – as opposed to paramount consideration 
– is taken of both the welfare of the child who may be born and any other child who may be 
affected by the birth. It is expressed as follows: 
 
A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been taken of the welfare 
of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment…and of any other child who may be 
affected by the birth.22 
 
Provided it could be shown that account had been taken of the welfare of children affected by 
a decision to provide fertility treatment, the HFEA was therefore relatively unconstrained in 
the kinds of activities it could choose to license, especially as nowhere within the 1990 Act – 
or indeed any legal documents containing a version of WP – can be found a definition of what 
constitutes child welfare.  
 
                                                     
18 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, s. 41(4). 
19 HL Deb, 6 March 1990, col. 1100.   
20 Jackson explores the differences in strength between versions of WP set out in The Children Act 
1989, The Adoption Act 1976 and The Child Support Act 1991, in her paper ‘Conception and The 
Welfare Principle’, noting that the principle can be seen in its strongest form in s. 1 of The Children 
Act where the welfare of the child is held to be the paramount consideration of the courts, in a slightly 
weaker form in The Adoption Act 1976 where it is held to be the courts first but, by implication, not 
only, consideration and in a weaker form still in the Child Support Act 1991 where Child support 
officers are required only to have regard to the welfare of any children who might be affected by their 
decisions. It should be noted however that The Adoption Act 1976 is no longer in force, having been 
replaced by the Adoption and Children Act 2002 within which a version of WP still exists, but a 
version which is identical to that found in the Children Act 1989. See: E. Jackson (2002) ‘Conception 
and The Irrelevance of The Welfare Principle’ The Modern Law Review, 65 (2), pp. 176-203.  
21 Children Act, 1989, s.1 (1).  
22 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, s.13 (5).   
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Within the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002 however, a set of 
factors is included which the court and other relevant authorities are directed to have regard, all 
of which are noted by Barlow to “have been commonly used to identify a child’s needs and to 
determine… the best way to meet them”.2324 These factors were not included in the 1990 Act 
and the HFEA was thus left to determine the kinds of activities that may and may not engage 
the WP. Yet, while the WP was open to HFEA interpretation, HFEA understanding of the 
demands of the principle was broader than it might have been. Since the first edition of the 
Code it was held that any disease or disability might well engage s. 13. Thus, in order to 
properly take account of the welfare of the child it was noted: “centres should bear in mind… 
any risk of harm to the child or children who might be born, including the risk of inherited 
disorders”.25 This was further expanded in later versions of the Code, which by the 7th edition 
read: 
 
In order to take into account the welfare of the child, the centre should consider factors… likely to 
cause serious physical, psychological or medical harm, either to the child to be born or to any 
existing child of the family. These factors include… any aspect of the patient’s (or, where 
applicable, their partner’s) medical history which means that the child to be born is likely to suffer 
from a serious medical condition.26  
 
Those who might have requested the use of ARTs to select for disability would thus have 
been highly unlikely to have their request granted prior to the 2008 Act where it could be 
demonstrated that the condition selected for was of sufficient gravity to be classed as a ‘serious 
medical condition.’ Testing embryos for some particular disability and then selecting for the 
condition may well have been viewed to violate the welfare provision, as understood in the 
Codes. Of course, as s.13 of the 1990 act required only that the welfare of children created be 
taken into account when determining whether to license a treatment, the HFEA could also have 
concluded that despite threats to the welfare interests of the child created, these would be 
outweighed by the interests of his potential parents. 
  
As the Codes became longer and more detailed the likelihood anyone would be permitted 
to use ARTs to ensure the birth of a deaf child became smaller still. For example, since 1998 it 
had been HFEA policy to refuse donations of gametes from those with genetic diseases or other 
“deleterious recessively inherited” genetic conditions.27 In 2003 when policy regarding the use 
of PGD was first given it was noted that PGD should only be used to test for genetic 
abnormalities where there is “a significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present in 
the embryo”28, and when it is known that one or more members of a couple possess a high 
likelihood of transmitting a genetic condition onto their offspring. Indeed, the code states that 
in such cases “all reasonable steps should be taken to prevent the transmission of serious genetic 
disorders”.29  Thus, although the Code had held since the 6th edition that HFEA licensing 
committees must, when deciding whether or not to license PGD, consider “the unique 
circumstances of those seeking treatment, rather than the fact that they carry a particular genetic 
condition” 30  – and thus the possibility that potential parents might, in line with social 
constructionist accounts of disability, argue that the disability should not be considered serious– 
                                                     
23 A. Barlow (1991) The Children Act 1989: The Private Law, London: Fourmat Publishing, p. 10.  
24 Such factors include the requirement that the courts take into account the child’s wishes regarding 
their decision (should he have any), what his needs may be (whether they be physical, emotional and/or 
educational), how a change in his circumstances might affect him and whether it would be better for 
him should no change occur, his age, sex, background and other characteristics, any harm he has 
suffered as well as any harm he may suffer as a result of their decision. 
25 HFEA, Code of Practice, 1st ed. (London, HFEA, 1990), para. 3.14. 
26 HFEA, Code of Practice, 7th ed. (R.4), (London, HFEA, 2008), para. G.3.3.2.  
27 HFEA, Code of Practice, 4th ed. (London, HFEA, 1998), para. 3.59-60.  
28 HFEA, Code of Practice, 6th ed. (London, HFEA, 2003), para. 14.22. 
29 HFEA, Code of Practice, 6th ed. (London, HFEA, 2003), para. 4.10.  
30 HFEA, Code of Practice, 6th ed. (London, HFEA, 2003), para. 14.20.  
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the HFEA had never licensed the use of PGD for the purpose screening in any specific genetic 
traits for social reasons. Indeed, since the 3rd edition of the Code it was noted too that they 
would refuse to license other forms of social selection such as sex selection and allow for the 




II.II. Selection for Disability and The HFE Act 2008 
 
Since the HFE Act 2008 the law governing the activities of fertility clinics in England and 
Wales has tightened greatly. Where there were once only instructions to take into account the 
welfare of those who might be born through fertility treatment, far stricter legislative provisions 
governing the purposes for which PGD and other means of selection may be used in fertility 
treatment are now in place. The Act provides an exhaustive list of the purposes for which PGD 
may be licensed and while accepted purposes include the testing of embryos in order to discover 
whether they have a “gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality… a gender related 
serious physical or mental disability… a gender related serious illness… or any other gender 
related serious medical condition”,32 selecting for disability after such testing reveals a positive 
diagnosis is now prohibited. In relation to the selection of donors and donor gametes the same 
rules apply. The licensing conditions now state that when determining: “the persons who are to 
provide gametes…the woman from whom an embryo is to be taken… [and] which of two or 
more embryos to place in a woman”33 “persons or embryos that are known to have a gene, 
chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality involving a significant risk that the person with the 
abnormality will have or develop – (a) a serious physical or mental disability, (b) a serious 
illness, or (c) any other serious medical condition, must not be preferred to those that are not 
known to have such an abnormality”.34  
 
The HFEA thus no longer possesses the discretion that made a positive response to a 
prospective parent’s request for disability selection prior to the 2008 Act a very slim possibility. 
For while there still exist some technical loopholes in the law35 – such as where testing reveals 
all embryos to be affected, only affected embryos are viable, or all embryos are implanted – 
potential parents would not be able to select affected embryos even if it can be successfully 
argued that to do so would not violate the WP (which is still present in the 2008 legislation). 
This is so as if PGD is licensed to test for a particular condition it is licensed on the basis that 
the condition is classified as serious rather than trivial, where a determination of seriousness is 
made after consideration of medical and social factors such as “the likely degree of suffering 
associated with the condition… the availability of effective therapy now, and in the future, the 
speed of degeneration in progressive disorders… the extent of any intellectual impairment… 
                                                     
31 These were summarised by the Department of Health as follows: to avoid the transmission of 
inherited disorders and diseases; to avoid sex linked diseases; to screen out chromosomal abnormalities 
to increase likelihood of live birth; or in order that the child created via fertility treatment was able to 
become a tissue donor for a seriously ill sibling.  See: Department Of Health (2005), Review of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: A Public Consultation,  p. 39.  
32 Human Fertilisation Act 1990 (as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008), 
Sch. 2.3.1ZA, s.(1).  
33 ibid , s.13(8) 
34 ibid, s.13(9).  
35 Elliston notes in her 2012 paper (op. cit. note 4) that it may be possible for couples to circumvent the 
2008 amendments in order to select for implantation an embryo that has a known disability after PGD 
by creating only one embryo at a time such that the embryo selected cannot be said to have been 
‘preferred to other available embryo’s’ where such a preference is judged to have occurred when one 
embryo from one particular IVF batch is preferred as opposed to all of the embryo’s available to a 
woman for implantation ( which would include all spare IVF embryos/embryo’s available via embryo 
adoption schemes).  
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the social support available”.36 Thus, those who wish to select for disability cannot argue that 
the condition they desire to test for should not be considered a serious medical condition, 
disease or disability by reference, for example, to social constructivist accounts of disability.  
For, if this were so the use of PGD to test for it would be prohibited just as is sex selection by 
provisions banning the use of embryo testing for anything other than the purposes specified in 
schedule 2 of the amended Act. 
 
 
III. WHY PROHIBIT SUCH SELECTION? 
 
As can be seen in the previous section, the HFE Act 2008 has significantly changed the possible 
outcomes of requests regarding the use of ARTs to select for disability. For, while it was 
unlikely under the 1990 Act that the HFEA would approve such requests, the legislative 
provisions inherent in the 2008 Act have now made such selection virtually impossible. Some 
might view this development to be uninteresting given the small number of individuals who are 
and will, in the future, be affected by it. However, the question of whether any legislative 
change can be justified in accordance with the principles underpinning our legal system should 
be of interest to any jurist regardless of the number of individuals affected. I now turn to the 
question of the justifications that have been given for the legislative change just outlined.  
 
While there are numerous accounts of the purposes, functions and limits of the law to which 
we might possibly appeal as providing justification or condemnation of a legal prohibition on 
selection for disability, a treatment of all such accounts cannot be attempted in this paper. 
Instead, it will be assumed that within broadly liberal democracies such as England and Wales 
a liberal framework for law is appropriate. As such, whether a prohibition can be justified will 
be determined in accordance with those principles agreed upon as providing adequate reason 
for the prohibition of activities in a liberal society. 
 
 
III.I. What Might Justify A Prohibition on Selection for Disability in A Liberal Society? 
 
While there is no one version of liberalism to which all who subscribe to a broadly liberal 
framework for society will agree, certain fundamental ideas are common to the most prevalent 
accounts. These include a commitment to moral individualism, the basic equality of persons 
and the belief that there should be a distinction between public and private morality. Thus, 
regardless of the extra content one adds, the primary job of any liberal state should be seen as 
to work out the terms under which persons, who naturally differ and disagree in their 
fundamental religious, philosophical and moral convictions can live together in peaceful 
political association in a way that both preserves and enlarges freedoms by accommodating 
these fundamental differences instead of reducing them by the legal enforcement of 
agreement.37 
 
In his four volume series The Moral Limits of The Criminal Law Feinberg identified four broad 
candidates to which we might appeal when attempting to provide justification for state 
imposition on individual liberty: harms to others, offence to others, harms to self and legal 
moralism. However, as Feinberg noted only the first two of these and, perhaps to some limited 
extent, the third,38 may be seen, in a liberal state as providing good reason for prohibition. 
                                                     
36 HFEA Code of Practice, 8th edition (R4), s. 10.7.  
37 C. Larmore (1996), The Morals of Modernity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121-127  
38 Dworkin, for example suggests that ‘soft paternalism’ can be justified in a liberal state in cases when 
our current and irrationally held desires are denied in order to preserve those desires we would deem 
rational if we were thinking clearly as in the case of forcing motorcyclists to wear helmets and 
Feinberg suggests that the state may be justified in temporarily curtailing our liberty or in order to 
establish the voluntariness of a preference. See: G. Dworkin (1972), ‘Paternalism’, The Monist, 56 (1), 
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Arguments falling into the fourth category should however, be wholly rejected as “there are 
some disagreements about the good life and ultimate values that we do not have to settle in 
order to decide collectively how we will pursue justice and the common good”.3940 As such it 
is held that the criminal law should be concerned only with what Feinberg termed ‘Legislative 
Evils’, defined as “reasonably foreseeable or preventable consequences of human beings’ 
actions or omissions.”41 
 
It is therefore prudent, before examining the reasons that have been given within legal and 
policy documents for a prohibition on selection for disability, to briefly sketch an account of 
what it means for some action to cause harm or offence to others in a legally admissible sense.  
 
Generally, when we state that some particular person (x) has been harmed by some event or 
action (y) we use the term to mean that x’s interests – defined as distinguishable components 
of his wellbeing – have been set back, thwarted or defeated as a result of the action or event in 
question. Counterfactually then, we are claiming that x is worse off than he otherwise would 
have been had y not occurred.42 Therefore, x is harmed when struck unawares by lightning or 
by some person (z) with a broken bottle because both events cause x to experience something 
he has an interest in avoiding: significant and unwanted pain. When we state that x is harmed 
by y in a sense that may justify our legislating against it, however, we utilise the concept of 
harm slightly differently. We cannot, after all, prohibit lightning and would not condone z’s 
striking x with the bottle if it turned out that by some fluke z’s act had actually benefited x on 
balance.43 This is because the legal sense of harm involves a normative component: an account 
of moral responsibility. Thus, when we claim that x is harmed in a legally admissible sense we 
claim not just a harm but also a wrong: a deliberate or negligent and unjustifiable violation or 
invasion of x’s interests. 
 
III.IV. What Does This Mean for Selective Reproduction? 
 
 For a liberal government to be justified in prohibiting some action it must therefore be shown 
that the act in question will not only cause or be likely to cause harm/offence to some 
identifiable party but that it is unjustifiable. Thus, when it comes to questions of what we should 
and should not allow prospective parents to do within the arena of reproduction, the liberal 
approach offers a clear account of the limits of reproductive freedom: persons should be 
formally free to choose whether they wish to procreate, with whom they wish to procreate, 
when they wish to do so, how many children they wish to have and what kinds of children they 
wish to have,44 provided that their choices do not cause unjustifiable harm or offence to others.  
 
                                                     
pp. 64-84; J. Feinberg (1989), The Moral Limits of The Criminal Law Volume 3: Harm To Self, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
39 T. Nagel (2006) 'Progressive but Not Liberal', The New York Review Of Books, 25th May 2006, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/may/25/progressive-but-not-liberal/, [last 
accessed 10 November 2013]. 
40 Such disagreements will be those regarding actions in which the liberty of one does not impinge 
upon the interests of others and thus causes no harm or offence to any party or can be shown to satisfy 
the volenti maxim. 
41 J. Feinberg (1990), The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 4: Harmless Wrongdoing, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 18.  
42 J. Feinberg (1987), The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 1: Harm to Others, Oxford: 
Oxford Univerity Press, p. 34. 
43 Such is of course, unlikely but possible. It could be the case, for example, that y’s striking x with the 
bottle could lead to doctors discovering while x was in hospital for his injuries that he has a brain 
tumour that while currently operable would, left untreated, have killed him within the next few weeks 
and that thus while y did indeed cause great harm to x by his actions, he also saved his life. 
44 A. Buchanan et al. (2000), From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 209-211. 
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Certain moral criticisms that we might, in a philosophical arena, level against practices 
such as selection for disability cannot – in good conscience at least – be used in a liberal society 
to justify a legal prohibition. This is so because, while available to each of us when it comes to 
the formulation of our own private moral codes, such arguments are incompatible with the basic 
liberal principles of non-perfectionism and reasonable pluralism that are required in the sphere 
of public morality. These arguments are easily identifiable and tend to fall into one of two 
camps.  
 
The first type of argument consists in the denial that the state should only concern itself 
with the consequences of human beings’ acts and omissions in favour of a broader account of 
the limits of the criminal law. According to such an account certain actions are held to be 
inherently wrong in virtue of their contravening some universal and, supposedly, undeniable 
moral principle or right. On such accounts, those who wish to select for disability might be 
charged with the possession of a faulty desire, of committing a category error in treating their 
prospective children as objects of desire or of wronging, but not harming their child, by 
violating some right on their part ‘to be born perfect’ or with ‘at least an average chance of 
living a good life’, among other things. 
 
 Arguments falling into the second camp however, retain the liberal focus on consequences 
but widen those consequences of relevance when determining the moral status of a particular 
action to encompass not only harms determined by reference to their impact on the interests of 
some particular person but also an impersonal account of harm (such as when it is claimed that 
to select for disability would harm ‘the world’ by lowering total net or average happiness).45  
 
III.V. What reasons have been given in legal and policy documents as providing justification 
for this prohibition? 
 
With these restrictions in mind let us now turn to the reasons that have been given as to 
why it was HFEA policy prior to the 2008 amendments to refuse to license PGD for selection 
for disability. The answer to this question is not hard to locate and can be found in HFEA’s 
concern that to select for disability in one’s offspring might engage the welfare provision of the 
licensing conditions of the 1990 Act given that the code also holds that the risk of inherited 
disease or disability is a risk of serious harm. This concern can be found in all versions of the 
HFEA Codes of Practice46 yet nowhere within such documents or other relevant documents is 
it expanded to explain exactly how this type of selection should be viewed as possibly causing 
serious harm to the child created and thus as being contrary to the welfare of the child provision.  
 
                                                     
45 For those unfamiliar with the notion of impersonal harm an account of both impersonal total and 
average harms as well as their implications can be found in Part IV of D. Parfit (1984), Reasons and 
Persons, Oxford: Clarendon Press. For examples of moral arguments for a duty to select against 
disability in one’s offspring based upon notions of impersonal harm see: J. Harris (1998), Clones, 
Genes and Immortality: Ethics and the Genetic Revolution, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 111;  
J. Savulescu (2001) 'Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children', Bioethics, 
15(5), p. 418; J. Savulescu & G. Kahane (2009), 'The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the 
Best Chance of the Best Life', Bioethics, 23/5, p. 277. 
46 See: HFEA, Code of Practice, 1st ed. (London, HFEA, 1990), para. 3.14(d);  
HFEA, Code of Practice, 2nd ed. (London, HFEA, 1993), para. 3.16(d);  
HFEA, Code of Practice, 3rd ed. (London, HFEA, 1995), para. 3.17(f);  
HFEA, Code of Practice, 4th ed. (London, HFEA, 1998), para. 3.17(g); 
HFEA, Code of Practice, 5th ed. (London, HFEA, 2001), para. 3.13(g)   
HFEA, Code of Practice, 6th ed. (London, HFEA, 2003), para. 3.12(v)(a).  
HFEA, Code of Practice, 7th ed. (R4) (London, HFEA, 2008), para. G.3.3.2.(c). 
HFEA, Code of Practice, 8th ed. (R4) (London, HFEA, 2012), para. 8.10.(b)(iii). 
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The first discussion of whether selection for disability should be prohibited within the HFE 
Act can be found in the HCSTC report on Human Reproductive Technologies and The Law. In 
a subsection of the ‘Selection and Screening’ section entitled ‘undesirable characteristics’ they 
summarised their position on the matter in the following rather ambivalent paragraph: 
 
We can imagine that many clinicians would baulk at the idea of selecting, for example, a deaf child 
using PGD, but we do not feel that the creation of a child with reduced life opportunities is sufficient 
grounds for regulatory intervention, else we might logically deny poor people IVF. Professor Tom 
Shakespeare told us that PGD should not be allowed to select out “minor or trivial” conditions such 
as restricted growth or deafness. On this basis, it is difficult to argue that they should not be selected 
rather than deselected. A more challenging but unlikely scenario would be the desire to select a 
child who would suffer obvious discomfort (rather than disadvantage), or worse. In this area there 




The DoH in their Review of the HFE Act: a Public Consultation also took an interest in 
the question of selection for disability, noting the existence of a “commonly expressed 
concern… that techniques used to screen out disabilities or impairments could also be used for 
screening in”.48 In the report the case of Duchesneau and McCullough was outlined (although 
not by name) as an example of the desire of some to select for disability in their offspring: 
“there has been a well-publicised case in the United States, of a deaf couple who wished to 
select a deaf donor so that the resulting child would also be deaf, and therefore share more 
closely the parents’ experience of the world.49 It was also noted that “The House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee considered this issue and concluded that the desire to select 
a child who would suffer obvious discomfort or worse was an area needing further debate”.50 
A question (no. 32) regarding this matter was thus inserted in the document: “Do you think that 
there should be a prohibition on deliberately screening in, or selecting for impairments or 
disabilities – as opposed to screening out, or selecting embryos free from diseases?”51  
 
After the consultation closed People Science and Policy collected and summarised the 
arguments put forward in the 535 replies sent in by organisations, medical and legal 
professionals and individual members of the public.52 A summary of responses to question 32 
was outlined in S.5.3: 
 
Those respondents who wanted to see screening in or selecting for impairments banned did so 
because they saw it as against the best interests of the child and reflecting the parents’ needs as 
opposed to the child’s…There were also responses in favour of allowing screening in or selecting 
for impairments. Some arguments put forward related to freedom of choice and the rights of adults 
to make choices… Some responses felt that the answer was not clear-cut and there may be 
circumstances when screening in might be desirable because ‘the basic classification of disabilities 
and impairments is not straightforward.’ The regulator was felt to be the relevant organisation in 
these cases … but the HFEA response said that they would like parliamentary guidance.53 
 
Despite large variations in the content of the responses to the consultation document the DoH 
proposals for revised legislation largely ignored what can only be described as a state of split 
opinion on the matter of selecting for disability among respondents to the consultation 
document. After “carefully considering a full range of viewpoints, suggestions and proposals” 
                                                     
47 House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, op. cit. note 3, p. 66. 
48 Department of Health, op. cit. note 31, s. 5.13.  
49 ibid 
50 ibid 
51 ibid. Annex B, Q. 27.  
52 People Science and Policy (On behalf of the Department of Health), (2006) ‘Report on the 
Consultation on the Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990’, s.1.2. 
53 ibid. s.5.3.  
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and balancing “competing claims of reproductive liberty and responsibility”54 the DoH seemed 
convinced by the arguments of those who wanted to see screening in for impairments banned 
and published the following recommendation regarding selection for disability: “the 
government will propose that the law is changed to include explicit criteria for the testing of 
embryos… Deliberately screening in a disease or disorder will be prohibited”.55  
 
Such was indeed the case and in May 2007 the Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill 
was published containing as part of the Conditions of Licensing for Treatment (s.21) the 
following:  
 
(8) In determining – 
(a) The persons who are to provide gametes for use in pursuance of the licence in a case where 
consent is required under paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 for the use in question,  
(b) The woman from whom an embryo is to be taken for use in pursuance of the licence, in a case 
where her consent is required under paragraph 7 of Schedule 3 for the use of the embryo, or 
(c) Which of two or more embryos to place in a woman,  
 
persons or embryos that are known to have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality 
involving a significant risk that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a serious 
physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any other serious medical condition must not be 




In May 2007 the Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill was 
appointed by a motion in the Houses of Commons and Lords with “terms of reference to 
consider and report on any draft Human Tissue and Embryos Bill presented to both Houses by 
a Minister of the Crown”57 by the 25th of July 2007. Their consideration of the matter of 
selection for disability was however, limited to nothing more than a description of the proposed 
changes to the act58.  No further mention was made of selection for disability or the rather 
serious lack of discussion regarding possible justifications for this proposed restriction of 
liberty in the government response to the joint committee report and by December 2007 when 
the Bill was introduced to the House of Lords the question of why it was imperative to ensure 
that selection for disability was prohibited had still not been answered. 
 
 Indeed, there is no evidence of sustained and reasoned discussion of this point within 
either the Lords or Commons Hansard. This is not, however, to say that the prohibition was 
ignored as selection for disability was mentioned in both Houses discussions of the Bill. 
Baroness Deech noted during a discussion regarding the parameters for screening and selecting 
embryos that “I hope your lordships will be pleased that the deliberate choice of an embryo that 
is, for example, likely to be deaf will be prevented”.59 Earl Howe, too noted, in a rather stirring 
monologue: 
 
New Subsections (9), (10) and (11) of Clause 14, which would amend Section 13 of the Act, focus 
upon pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and take us to a particular aspect of that issue which, but 
for these provisions, many of us might not otherwise have thought much about. They explicitly 
prohibit embryos being selected with a view to increasing the chance of having a child with a serious 
disability or medical condition. Consciously to wish such a disability or condition on a child may 
seem extraordinary, but there have been well-documented cases where parents who are disabled in 
                                                     
54 Department of Health (2006), Review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act: Proposals for 
revised legislation (CM6989), London: Department of Health, foreword.  
55  ibid, s. 2.43.  
56 Department of Health (2007), Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, London: Department of 
Health, s. 21(4). 
57 Joint Committee on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill (2007), Human Tissue and Embryos 
Draft Bill Volume I Report, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, s.1.  
58 ibid, app. 3, p. 88.  
59 HL Deb, 19 November 2007, col. 673.  
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a particular way have expressed a desire to have a child with the same disability. I find that idea 
repellent because it ignores one of the issues central to any IVF procedure, namely, the future 
welfare of the child. Therefore, I wholly support a ban on that type of embryo selection. The 
techniques available to diagnose the presence of genetic conditions in any embryo should be used, 
if they are used at all, to reduce the risk of a child being born with a serious handicap and to reduce 
the risk of suffering.60 
 
This was to be the end of the Lords discussions on the matter and Commons discussions 
also failed to provide any explanation of justifications for the prohibition. Indeed, while the 
Commons Hansard shows that officials within the Department of Health had made contact with 
several Deaf organisations that had publicly criticised section 14 of the new bill,6162 the only 
mention of selection for disability was in a summary of the Bill’s proposals regarding PGD. 
 
 
IV. HARM TO THE CHILD 
 
 
As can be seen above, the main justifications advanced in legal and policy documents in favour 
of prohibiting selection for disability in the UK have been based upon the notion that those who 
would use ARTs for such purposes would cause harm to the child created and thus fail to take 
into account WP as it has been expressed in both HFE Acts. Should this be the case a prohibition 
on such selection would be justifiable in accordance with liberal principles. However, it has 
also been observed that there has been very little, if any, real discussion within legal and policy 
documents of how exactly selection for disability might be seen to harm those children created 
as a result of such selection.  
 
IV.II. Child Welfare, PGD and The Non-Identity Problem. 
 
It is, in general, rather hard to find anyone with broadly liberal sensibilities willing to criticise 
the insertion of a welfare principle into the laws governing matters relating to children. Indeed, 
those arguments that do withstand scrutiny tend not to attack the spirit of such a principle as it 
is currently understood: the view that “children, being vulnerable, impressionable and 
dependent, must be protected from harm and given every opportunity to become successful 
adults”.63 Instead, such arguments tend to bring into question whether actual versions of the 
principle can be said to embody that spirit. They thus focus on whether the principle is too 
strong or requires too much from judges and other legal figures who are expected to balance 
numerous conflicting factors such as the child’s wishes; the child’s current and future interests; 
and predicting the outcomes for the child of various different arrangements.  
 
That such is the case, however, is understandable. For, regardless of one’s opinion on the 
matters above, it is a common feature of all reasonable religious, philosophical and political 
doctrines that persons are fundamentally equal, and must thus be treated with equal concern 
and respect. That someone has not reached majority is little reason to ignore their interests or 
treat such interests as of only secondary importance and steps must thus be taken to ensure that 
the interests of those who might easily be ignored are taken into account. The WP and principles 
like it serve this purpose by forcing the court and other legal bodies to take notice of the interests 
“the person whose voice may be the quietest both literally and metaphorically... who has the 
                                                     
60 HL Deb, 21 January 2008, col. 23.  
61 Such groups included the Royal National Institute for the Deaf, the British Deaf Association, 
Islington Deaf Campaign and the Stop Eugenics group. 
62 HC Deb, 2 April 2008, col. 1098W. 
63 S. Gilmore (2001), 'A Critical Perspective on the Welfare Principle', in LA Long and J Roche (eds.), 
The Law and Social Work: Contemporary Issues for Practice (1 edn.; Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan), p. 6.  
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least control over whether the issue arrives before the court or in the way that it does... the 
person with whom the court is least able to empathise”,64 the child. 
 
With almost universal support for the inclusion of the WP in the laws governing decisions 
relating to children it is unsurprising that when it was suggested that the principle be included 
in the laws governing the use of ARTs such a suggestion was met with resounding approval. 
Jackson, for example, notes that the inclusion of the principle was “greatly welcomed by every 
peer who expressed an opinion”65 when section 13(5) of the HFE Act 1990 was debated in 
parliament. It does seem intuitively to make sense that if we are concerned with ensuring the 
welfare of children once they are born we should be concerned too with taking steps to ensure 
that welfare prior to their birth. Yet, that it has been used to justify limiting the purposes for 
which ARTs may be licensed seems to be a step too far. This is because there is a crucial 
difference between taking into account the welfare of a particular extant/future child when 
making decisions that will impact his welfare, as in custody disputes and adoption hearings, 
and attempting to do the same when deciding whether to license the use of PGD for a specific 
purpose.  
 
This difference hinges upon the fact that while in former cases there is an actual child 
whose welfare may be affected by a court’s decision or protected by a particular piece of 
legislation, decisions made regarding the kinds of fertility activities to license seem to affect 
the identities, as opposed to the welfare of those children created. This problem is often termed 
‘the wrongful handicap conundrum’ and is a variation of a problem in philosophy known as 
‘the non-identity problem’ which essentially states that in cases where a child “could not have 
existed otherwise than in his suboptimal state… he has not been harmed by being born in his 
damaged state”66 unless his life will be less than one worth living.  
 
Parfit illustrates this point well with a thought experiment where he asks us to imagine two 
women, A and B. A is in the early stages of pregnancy and has been told by her doctor that 
unless she takes the pill he has just given her, the child she is carrying will develop a serious 
and painful disability. B is not yet pregnant but plans to become so soon. The doctor tells B she 
has a rare and bizarre medical condition which means that should she conceive now her child 
will be born with a disability similar to that which A’s child will have should A not take the 
pill. He notes however, that if B waits three months she will be able to conceive a healthy child. 
Both women are thus faced with a choice: A must choose whether or not to take the pill and B 
must decide whether or not to wait to conceive.  
 
Parfit suggests that the majority of us intuit that both A and B should, ceteris paribus, act 
in such a way so as to ensure they give birth to a healthy child: A should take the pill and B 
should wait to conceive and should they not make these decisions they would act wrongly. If 
A and B choose not to prevent disability in their offspring, they are viewed to harm their child 
because a child born without a painful disability is likely to have a far better life than a child 
born with one. In the case of A, Parfit notes that our intuition that she should take the pill in 
order to ensure the birth of a healthy child is in line with a commitment to harm prevention, 
since, if A does not take the pill, once born, her child might claim that in failing to prevent his 
disability, at very little personal cost, she has greatly harmed him. He could, after all, have been 
born without his disability. In B’s case however, harm-based accounts of wrong give B no 
moral reason to choose to conceive now or to wait, based on the interest of her child. For, 
although we might feel that B should wait, she has no reason to do so if we are to focus only 
upon whether her child would be harmed. If B heeds the doctor’s advice and waits for three 
months to conceive, the result will be a different child from that she would have conceived 
                                                     
64 Ibid, p. 5. 
65 E. Jackson, op. cit. note 20, p. 180. 
66 D. S. Davis (2001), Genetic Dilemmas: Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices and Children's 
Futures, London: Routledge, p. 35.  
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three months prior because our coming into existence depends upon both the timing and manner 
of our conception. Thus, while A’s child would have a claim to having been harmed should A 
choose not take the pill as she would be made worse off by A’s choice,  B’s child would not be 
harmed should B prove impatient. For, although he might prefer not to be disabled he cannot 
claim he has been harmed by her choice as to prefer that she had waited to conceive would be 
to prefer non-existence, an irrational preference, if his life is worth living. 6768 
 
A decision regarding whether to select an embryo or gamete donor based on their 
possession of certain disabling genetic traits is a decision more akin to B’s than A’s. Just as B’s 
decision will lead to the coming into existence of different persons, selection for a disabling 
genetic trait such as deafness will change, not the capacities of a particular possible person, but 
who it is that will come to exist. Should a pair of prospective parents deliberately create a deaf 
child via PGD and IVF, such a child could not exist without her disability. She may not 
complain that she has been harmed by the negligence or cruelty of her parents unless her life is 
so bad that existence is harmful. Thus, provided we are willing to accept that most disabilities, 
deafness included, do not render one’s lives less than worth living and that a life lived is a more 
desirable prospect than a life never lived at all69, we can conclude that her parents would not 
harm her by bringing her into existence. 
 
IV.III. A Right to An Open Future? 
 
Some however, have argued that to appeal to a violation of the interests of the child created by 
such forms of selection need not fall into the trap of the wrongful handicap conundrum.  Davis 
proposes that rather than view the ethical challenge posed by selection for disability as a conflict 
between the liberal requirements both to respect autonomy and to prevent harm we should 
instead “recast it as a conflict between respecting parental autonomy and the child’s potential 
autonomy”.70 She does so by applying an argument of Feinberg’s concerning children’s rights, 
known as the Open Future Argument (OFA) to the prenatal context, arguing that those who 
deliberately create impaired children violate the child’s “rights in trust”.71  
 
Feinberg derives a child’s possession of such rights from the rights adults in liberal 
societies possess to choose their own paths in life. As a corollary of such rights, Feinberg 
suggests children possess a similar type of right that requires we not close off certain key 
                                                     
67 D. Parfit (2006), 'Rights, Interests and Possible People', in P. Singer & H. Kuhse. (eds.), Bioethics: 
An Anthology, 2nd edn,  Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 88-90.  
68 It should be noted that dependent on the theory of personal identity to which we subscribe the 
conclusions of the non-identity problem may not pose an insurmountable obstacle to determinations of 
prenatal harm in cases such as that of B. If, for example we subscribe not to a biological or 
psychological criterion of personal identity, according to which our identities are fixed by our being a 
particular numerical entity or being psychologically connected to past and future versions of ourselves, 
but instead, to a placeholder account, according to which certain morally relevant aspects of our 
identities are fixed by the relationships in which we stand to others, the non-identity problem may not 
hold. This question has been explored in some depth in the paper: N. J. Williams (2013), ‘Possible 
Persons and The Problem of Prenatal Harm’, The Journal of Ethics, 17 (4), pp. 355-385. Yet, 
regardless, it should be noted that English and Welsh law tends to determine both claims to harm and 
moral responsibility in accordance with biological and psychological accounts of personal identity, 
rather than placeholder accounts. 
69 There are those who suggest otherwise such as Benatar who, as an anti-natalist argues that this 
‘cheerful belief’ is grossly misinformed and that coming into existence is always a serious harm. See D. 
Benatar (1997), ‘Why it is better never to come into existence’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 34 
(3), pp. 345-355.   
70 D. S. Davis (1997b), 'Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future', Rutgers Law 
Journal, 28, p. 562.  
71 see D. S. Davis, (1997C) 'Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open Future', The Hastings 
Center Report, 27 (2), pp. 7-15; D. S. Davis, op. cit. note 66.  
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choices they may wish to make when adults while they are still children.72 Such “rights in trust” 
protect children from decisions they themselves may make concerning their futures, such as 
deciding to drop out of school early as their future career plans as dancers or rock stars do not 
require much schooling and from parental beliefs and practices that may conflict with their 
future autonomy. They require that parents refrain from making serious and final commitments 
on their children’s behalf, waiting “until the child grows to maturity and is legally capable of 
making them himself”.73 An embodiment of these rights can be seen in the right of the state to 
act as parens patriae that has been used by the courts in cases such as in Re O74, Re S75, Re R76, 
Re A77 and An NHS Trust v SR78. In such cases parental decisions to deny life-saving medical 
treatment for their offspring on the basis of religious/spiritual beliefs have been overruled on 
the grounds that such children were not yet capable of forming their own religious convictions 
and that their parents choices would ensure they would not live long enough to do so. 
 
A less stark, and consequently more fitting, example for the case of selection for disability 
can be found in the case of Wisconsin vs. Yoder.79 Here, members of an Amish community won 
the right to withdraw their children from school at the age of fourteen as opposed to the state 
requirement of sixteen. Their request was granted after they managed to persuade the court of 
two things: first, that sending their children to school past the age of fourteen was antithetical 
to their religion and could potentially destroy the Amish way of life as “higher learning tends 
to develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from God”,80 and second, that as 
education’s value is assessed by its ability to prepare children for life: 
 
[i]t is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be 
necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority 
live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of a child for life 
in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith.81 
 
While the courts found in favour of the Amish, they did so by begging the question 
“against anyone who suggests that some Amish children might freely and even wisely decide 
to enter the modern world if given the choice”.82Although Feinberg agreed with the ruling, 
noting that in the modern world the difference between eight and ten years of education is 
relatively trivial and likely to make little difference to the prospects of any particular 
individual83, others, also committed to the OFA, disagree. Davis, for example, argues that “if 
Wisconsin had good reasons for settling on high school graduation or age sixteen as the legal 
minimum to which children are entitled, then the Amish children were entitled to that minimum 
as well, despite their parents’ objections”.84  
 
Davis proposes that as in Wisconsin vs. Yoder, those who deliberately seek to create 
disabled children impinge upon their child’s right to an open future. She suggests that such 
individuals wilfully narrow their child’s future range of options so considerably that “liberalism 
requires us to intervene to support that child’s future ability to make her own choices about 
                                                     
72 J. Feinberg (1992), 'The Child's Right to an Open Future', in J. Feinberg (ed.), Freedom and 
Fulfilment: Philosophical Essays, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 76-78.  
73  ibid, p. 80.   
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83  ibid. 
84 D. S.  Davis, op. cit. note 66, p. 27.  
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which of the many diverse visions of life she wishes to embrace”.85 According to Davis’ reading 
of the OFA, a liberal state is justified in prohibiting prospective parents from selecting for 
disability in their offspring as permitting it would allow prospective parents too much control 
over their offspring’s futures.  
 
Yet, while this reading of the OFA does sit well with the current legal status of selection 
for disability, questions do remain. How open, for example, must a child’s future be and at what 
level of expected openness may a parent violate their child’s right to an open future? No person 
can have a truly open future and in the process of helping their children fulfil their potential 
parents will necessarily close off certain future options to their children. A parent of a gifted 
child musician may, for example, forego ensuring she develop a complement of rounded talents 
to help her fulfil her dreams. Similarly, the child of a parent who places a great deal of import 
on a balanced education and fostering independence will never have the option of doing a great 
many things that involve intense and focused training from an early age. Those who subscribe 
to such an application of the OFA might feasibly reply to such an objection by stating that the 
parental decisions in the cases above are of insufficient gravity to invoke the OFA. Thus, such 
individuals would claim that parents should be free to shape their children’s futures and  limit 
certain opportunities in order to open the door to others, but that such freedoms are limited. 
Consequently, while parents should be free to spend or refrain from spending thousands of 
pounds on musical instruction, dance classes, and tennis coaching this does not mean they 
should be free to deny them their education, or, by the same token, a particular ability, such as 
hearing in the case of selection for deafness. This line of thought is understandable as it is the 
case with lives, just as it is with coats or shoes, that we are more likely to find one that fits when 
we are provided with a large number of choices86  
 
We must, however, question whether Davis’ application of the OFA to the pre-natal case 
is coherent. After all, one cannot harm someone by bringing them into existence when their life 
will, on balance, be one worth living. When looking to the OFA to determine whether a 
particular parental action is justified the answer is found by looking to its effects on that child’s 
future. Amish parents may be criticised for a decision to remove their child from school at 
fourteen because that child, if she chooses to leave the Amish community, will be 
disadvantaged by that decision. She would have a legitimate complaint against her parents as 
they saw fit only to provide her with the education necessary to follow their chosen path for 
her. The case of selection against disability however, is different. A child who is deaf, for 
example, is likely to have a less open future than a hearing child, and may well be born at a 
disadvantage. However, unlike the Amish child she would not have a legitimate complaint as 
she could not be born hearing. Deafness is a condition of her existence and her right to an open 
future is one that may only exist within her genetic limitations.  
 
This does not mean that her parents cannot be charged with violating her right to an open 
future by denying her opportunities to hear after her birth by deliberately failing to provide her 
with hearing aids, adequate language therapy, or a cochlear implant. In such circumstances 
their child may have a legitimate complaint, but this is an altogether different issue that although 
may influence parental decisions regarding selection for deafness may not be addressed fully 
here. Either way, it seems that by itself the OFA can offer no reason to avoid disability in our 
offspring but could possibly render the decision to select a child with a ‘curable’ disability self-
defeating.87 
                                                     
85 D. S. Davis, op. cit. note 71, p. 11.  
86 J. S. Mill (1989), On Liberty and Other Writings, ed. S. Collini, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 67.  
87 This is couched in hypothetical terms for the debate concerning cochlear implants and open future 
arguments is far from straightforward. A deaf child with a cochlear implant or a hearing aid is still a 
deaf child with an experience of the world entirely distinct from a hearing child. For an insight into this 




V. HARM OR OFFENCE TO OTHERS? 
 
 
During the Lords debates on the HFE Bill, Earl Howe attempted to define a serious disease or 
disability and thus of whether it should be prevented as something to be assessed, not from the 
point of view of the NHS or a prospective parent or indeed the interests of any other interested 
parties, but from “the point of view of the child when they are born”.88 However, as explained 
in the previous section it cannot be shown that the practice of selection for disability causes 
harm to the interests, whether current or future of the child created.  
 
As such, despite Earl Howe’s protestations it seems that a prohibition on such selection may be 
justified in accordance with liberal principles only by appeals to harms and offenses other than 
those already appealed to within existing legal and policy documents: those which selection for 
disability may impose on the interests of others than the child created. In this section the 
question of whether decisions to create impaired offspring might be said to cause unjustifiable 




V.II. Harm to Others: Resources and The Cost of Care.  
 
By far the most likely candidate for an attempt to justify a blanket prohibition on selection for 
disability by reference to the harms that such selection might impose on others is based upon 
the fact that in countries with advanced public healthcare and social welfare systems such as 
England and Wales, persons with disabilities tend to place a heavy burden on society’s shared 
resources. Thus, if, by prohibiting deliberate selection of disabling traits, we could lessen this 
burden and make available more and better resources to already extant persons who need them 
there seems good reason to implement such a prohibition.  
 
The issue, however, is not so simple. For, while those with disabilities do tend to withdraw 
more from and contribute less towards the social pot than other ‘healthy’ members of society 
the reasons given for this differ greatly depending upon whether one views the disvalue of 
particular inabilities/disabilities to be inherent, or exherent, a product, not of biological 
limitation, but the structure of society. On the former view, it is understandable that a desirable 
way to combat the burdens of disability is to prevent the births of those who would be disabled. 
On the latter view however, disability is held to be socially constructed with many of the 
disadvantages normally associated with impairments attributed “not to the physical, cognitive, 
or emotional characteristics of individuals, but to the failure to account for everyone when 
designing physical, economic and social institutions”.90 Thus, in choosing how to construct our 
societies we choose who will and will not be disabled. This point is well made as society is 
designed to cater for the majority of the populous and thus does place barriers to the 
participation of those who depart from societal norms. 
                                                     
Lane and Grodin', Kennedy Institute Of Ethics Journal, 7 (3), pp. 253-8; and P. Kermit (2009), 
'Cochlear Implants, Linguistic Rights and 'Open Future' Arguments. ', in K. Kristiansen and S. Vehmas 
(eds.), Arguing About Disability, London: Routledge, pp. 137-153.  
88 HL Deb, 21 January 2008, vol. 698, cols 24-25.   
89 It should be noted that within this section two additional potential claims to harm are not addressed. 
These include harms to parents themselves, and in cases where those who would select for disability in 
their offspring, harms to their existing children (and other dependents). Such arguments, however, are 
considered in some detail in my paper: N. J. Williams (2016), ‘Harms to Others and The Selection 
Against Disability View’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 42 (2), pp. 154-183.    
90 A. Asch (2003), ‘Disability equality and prenatal testing: contradictory or compatible?’ Florida State 
University Law Review, 30 (2), p. 319.  
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Those who subscribe to the latter view – often termed social or minority group views - 
suggest that in many cases what is needed is not a “cure” for the inabilities certain disabled 
persons have but instead a cure for the institutions allowing inabilities to be disabilities.91 Those 
unable to walk – so the argument goes – need wheelchairs and wheelchair accessible buildings, 
those who are D/deaf require adaptations to the environment which make lack of hearing 
inconsequential in their daily lives and those who view those with inabilities to be incapable of 
work that is not ruled out by their inabilities need education. Such a definition of disability is 
thus tied to notions of social justice, to the idea that in a liberal, pluralist society, justice requires 
that we “arrange society so as to accommodate and facilitate a maximally plural range of views 
and ways of living”.92 
 
Certainly, to alter the arrangements of society in this way would require increased 
spending of common resources, which seems to lend support to the argument that perhaps we 
should prevent the birth of the disabled to lessen the strain on our already stretched resources. 
Yet, as only a small percentage of disabled persons are born disabled and the majority become 
disabled later in life93 it is questionable as to whether any money would actually be saved. One 
might therefore note that the money society spends on increasing access to disabled persons to 
healthcare and society would likely not be reduced unless we abandon our commitment to 
equality or choose “a campaign of eliminating disabled people in addition to preventing the 
births of those who would be disabled”.94 Thus, while those with disabilities may have a claim 
to being harmed by the attitudes of non-disabled persons towards their inabilities and the 
structure of society it is unlikely that those who would be affected negatively by the decision 
to select for disability would have a justifiable claim to being harmed by such a choice. 
 
V.III. Might Allowing Selection for Disability Cause Harm to Those with Disabilities? 
 
Another possible justification for a prohibition on selection for disability is based on the idea 
that to allow some individuals to select for disability in their offspring may result in an 
unwillingness on the part of non-disabled members of society to provide support to persons 
with disabilities for which certain couples have deliberately chosen in their offspring. Such a 
criticism focuses upon the relationships between different members of society, and commonly 
held intuitions regarding the limits of what justice may require of us both in an individual sense 
and within our social institutions. While justice may require that we compensate for inequalities 
of birth and natural endowments and that the better off make some sacrifices in order to elevate 
the position of the worst-off,95 people are generally more willing to provide compensation to 
others for inequalities in terms of welfare, opportunity and resources when such inequalities 
are held to be the result of brute luck as opposed to considered choices. This can be seen easily 
when one considers the decision of the NHS Blood and Transplant Service to use pictures and 
videos of sick children, wholesome looking families and athletes in their attempts to get people 
to sign up to the organ donor register or to donate blood instead of images and videos of 
alcoholics requiring liver transplants and gang members with knife wounds. 
 
                                                     
91 See, for example: R. Amundson (1992), ‘Disability, Handicap and the Environment’ Journal of 
Social Philosophy, 23 (1),  pp. 105-119 & A. Asch, op. cit. note 90, pp. 315-342.  
92 S. N. Glackin (2010), ‘Tolerance and illness: the politics of medical and psychiatric classification’, 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35 (4), p. 11.   
93 According to the 2015/16 Family Resources Survey, while there are over ten million disabled 
persons living in the UK, children with disabilities are likely to amount to around 7% of the total 
population and those over state pension age make up around 44% of the number.  See: Department For 
Work and Pensions (2017), Family Resources Survey, London: Department for Work and Pensions, p. 
1.   
94 A. Asch (1999), 'Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy', 
American Journal of Public Health, 89 (11),  p. 1652.  
95 J. Rawls (1971), A Theory of Justice, Revised edn.; Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, p. 86.  
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 Sandel, for example, speaking of genetic testing in general, has suggested that the 
availability of such technologies has resulted in an “explosion of responsibility for our own fate 
and that of our children [that] may diminish our sense of solidarity with those less fortunate 
than ourselves”,96 and that as a result of this we may feel less willing provide support for such 
persons. Taken at face value such an argument is faced with a patent flaw, noted by Kamm and 
Fox which is that “it makes no sense to hold a designer child morally responsible for the natural 
tendencies with which she is born, since it would be either her parents or reproductive 
physicians who chose or manipulated those characteristics prenatally, and she could not have 
done anything herself, before she was born, to have made her genetic characteristics come out 
any different”.97 Yet to read the argument in this manner would lack charity and miss the 
subtlety of the claim, which is not that people would be right to be less willing to provide 
support, but that regardless of the rightness/wrongness of their attribution of responsibility, they 
would still be more inclined to do so. 
 
 Such a claim is evidenced in peoples’ willingness to take pride in their appearance despite 
the fact that they have played no more of a part in its creation than had their beauty been crafted 
by a plastic surgeon.98 Politically, one can also see such sentiments in affirmative action and 
intergenerational reparations for historic injustices in which people are held to be “accountable 
for the wrongs of their ancestors or the groups to which they belonged”,99 not just because they 
benefit from those wrongs, which is a valid reason for reparation, but because persons are 
representatives of family lines, generations can be tied together (although as time passes 
relations are viewed to become weaker) and as such their relation is viewed to be morally 
relevant. Yet, while such is the case, that persons seem to attribute responsibility for things 
beyond their control seems less to be an issue for philosophy or law and more of an issue for 
education, requiring concerted attempts to remove this fiction. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Within this paper the legal prohibition for selection for disability in England and Wales was 
examined and explored. The reasons provided in legal and policy documents for this prohibition 
were also outlined and subjected to philosophical scrutiny. Liberal approaches regarding the 
purposes, functions and limits of the law were explored and it was suggested after Feinberg that 
the criminal law should be concerned only with ‘legislative evils’, which were defined as 
reasonably foreseeable or preventable consequences of human beings’ actions or omissions. As 
such, in order for a liberal government to be justified in prohibiting the practice selection for 
disability it must be shown that the act in question will, or be liable to, cause harm or offence 
to others by deliberately and/or negligently and unjustifiably violating, setting back or 
thwarting their interests.  
 
The reasons given within legal and policy documents for the prohibition were then outlined and 
it was noted that such reasons, where, indeed, they have been given, have focused on the idea 
that to allow selection for disability would cause harm to the child created. By reference to the 
non-identity problem it was shown that such arguments do not stand up to philosophical 
scrutiny. For, in cases where a child could not exist otherwise than with his disability he cannot 
be harmed by being born with a disability unless his life can be shown to be one that is less 
than one worth living. The question of whether a child’s future autonomy might be violated by 
                                                     
96 M. J. Sandel (2007), The Case Against Perfection: ethics in the age of genetic engineering, 
Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, p. 89. 
97 D. Fox (2007), ‘Silver spoons and golden genes: genetic engineering and the egalitarian ethos’, 
American Journal of Law and Medicine, 33 (4), p. 599 
98 R. Dworkin (2000), Sovereign Virtue. The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, p. 445. 
99  ibid, p. 603.  
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such selection was also examined and it was found that while convincing when applied to extant 
children such arguments lack coherence when applied to cases of pre-natal selection. It was 
thus suggested that within a liberal society only those reasons focussing on the harms and 
offences that such selection may cause to already extant persons are liable to offer good reason 
to prohibit selection for disability. Yet, while it was noted that those with disabilities do tend 
to command more societal resources than others it was shown, by appeals to social 
constructionist accounts of disability that although those with disabilities may have a claim to 
being harmed by the attitudes of non-disabled persons towards their inabilities and the structure 
of society it is unlikely that those who would be affected negatively by the decision to select 
for disability would have a justifiable claim to being harmed by such a choice. 
 
It is thus suggested that within a liberal society no good reason can be found for the 
prohibition of selection for disability and that the insertion into English and Welsh Law of such 
legislation represents an unfortunate and misguided encroachment by the state into what should 
be seen as a matter of private morality. For, while many of us may question the wisdom of a 
desire to select for disability in one’s offspring these very differences of opinion regarding what 
it is that constitutes the good life were what the liberal political order was designed to 
accommodate. However, while such is the case, whether or not those who seek to deliberately 
create disabled offspring should be helped to do so requires further debate as, indeed, does the 
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